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Digital gifts are ubiquitous on the internet: web pages, blog entries, social media posts, 
photographs, videos, and contributions to advice forums, for example, are widely made 
available for anyone to use without payment or reciprocation. And they are becoming 
increasingly important in the lives of an increasing number of internet users, with the 
International Telecommunication Union reporting that 2.7 billion people are now online 
(ITU 2013: 2). It may be tempting to see all this digital giving as occupying a social 
space in which commerce is absent and community therefore present, but this would be 
to fall into the trap of the commerce/community dualism that this volume seeks to 
question.  
 
In the terms of this dualism, commerce, on the one hand, represents the commodity 
economy as it is understood in neoclassical economics, in which actors assume rational 
personae and engage in asocial exchanges at market prices with a view to optimising over 
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their preference functions. Community, on the other, represents a space about which this 
tradition of economics is largely silent, a space that acts for it as a kind of dumping 
ground for all those social activities that can be dismissed as uneconomic, activities that 
might be of interest to sociologists and anthropologists, but activities that these 
economists assume they can safely ignore. In this space, for example, people have 
emotions, they have values, they are socialised into normative patterns of action, they 
have relationships with each other, they resemble each other or differ from each other, 
they support each other or undermine each other, and they sometimes give to each other 
without calculation or reciprocation. This is, no doubt, a straw binary, a caricatured 
representation, and there are certainly many economic studies that depart from it, such as 
those on pro-social behaviour documented by Meier (2006), yet it is still one that is 
worthy of critique if it resonates closely with the assumptions really (if not necessarily 
consciously) made by many economists. 
 
In this context, community has an essentially negative function: it is the other of 
commerce, and must be kept strictly separated from commerce in order to preserve the 
purity and the mathematical tractability of the economy as it is represented in mainstream 
economics. To question the dualism, then, is to pose a threat to the integrity of the work 
done in that tradition.  
 
In the context of this straw binary, we could arguably replace the word community with 
any other that would encompass those aspects of human social behaviour that are to be 
excluded from economics. Yet it is a word with a history, a word that has symbolised the 
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social side of this distinction, or some variant of it, at least since the work of Ferdinand 
Tönnies (2003 [1887]). For Tönnies, and for many others, community, or rather 
Gemeinschaft, usually translated as community, not only indicates a range of social 
phenomena that are excluded from most representations of the commercial economy, but 
also ties them together into a kind of romantic ideal type: “a spontaneously arising 
organic social relationship characterized by strong reciprocal bonds of sentiment and 
kinship within a common tradition” (Merriam-Webster 2013). Such conceptions of 
community function as cover for an imaginary ideal of interpersonal harmony based on 
multiple congruent affiliations and affinities, but these understandings of community are 
at least as problematic as the concept of a purely rational asocial economy. They miss, for 
example, the diversity of communities in contemporary society, their exclusionary nature, 
their radical intersectionality in the sense that any individual may belong to multiple 
communities, the decreasing importance of kinship and locality as a basis for community, 
the socially constructed nature of the cultural affinities that many communities are built 
around, and the existence of commercial relationships alongside relationships of affect 
between the same people. Most social life and most economic life, which I take to be a 
part of social life and not somehow distinct from it, conforms to neither the mainstream 
economic model of commerce nor the romantic model of community. Actual commerce 
and actual community are both more complex and more interwoven than the commerce-
community binary suggests.  
 
This chapter explores those relationships by considering the increasingly important 
phenomenon of digital gifts. In the commerce/community dualism, gifts would seem to 
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belong firmly on the side of community, with the implication that they are given only to 
those with whom we have close existing relationships, in a normatively endorsed process 
that is often seen as making and strengthening connections within the community. But 
one of the striking characteristics of digital gifts is that they are often gifts to strangers, 
gifts that entail no obligation to reciprocate. Another is that they are by no means always 
divorced from commercial interests: many digital gifts are given in the pursuit of profit.  
 
Digital gifts thus prompt us to question multiple implications of the 
commerce/community binary, and point the way towards an alternative understanding of 
the economy, in which it is understood as deeply social, with both commercial and non-
commercial aspects, and deeply entangled with communities: but communities that take 
diversely unromantic forms.  This chapter also seeks to contribute to a number of wider 
yet related arguments: first, that giving is an economic activity and an important one in 
contemporary societies; second, that there is a diverse range of giving practices, which do 
not all function in the same way or have the same implications; third, that in some 
contexts certain giving practices are a promising alternative to commodity exchange; but 
fourth, that giving is often entangled with other economic practices in complex and 
interesting ways. 
 
Gifts and digital gifts 
For mainstream economics, the economy is precisely coextensive with the commodity 
economy: it essentially consists of transfers of goods and services that take the form of 
exchange and productive activity that is undertaken with the intention of exchanging the 
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product. There may be grudging extensions for the state sector, which is brought back 
into the exchange economy by measuring it in terms of the purchase of inputs as 
commodities rather than in terms of the value of its outputs, but giving, and production 
for giving, is generally excluded without even an acknowledgement that the exclusion 
has taken place. The exceptions are 1) gifts of money and 2) products which are produced 
and purchased as commodities in order to be given as gifts, which are of interest to 
economists only in their role as commodities and cease to be of interest as soon as they 
have been purchased by the eventual giver of the gift.  
 
Yet many of our needs, material and otherwise, are met by activities that fall outside the 
commodity economy. If the economy is to be defined in terms of the function it performs, 
then, rather than in terms of a self-confirming dogma about the form the economy should 
take, it cannot be identical with commerce, or with the commodity economy, but must 
also include those other activities. Instead, it is more coherent and plausible to understand 
the economy in terms of the provisioning of goods and services, as economic thinkers 
from a range of heterodox traditions have done (Boulding 1973; Boulding 1986; Dugger 
1996; Garnett 2007; Gruchy 1987; Nelson 1993; Sayer 2004: 2). When we do think of the 
economy in these terms, it becomes clear that giving is an economic activity in much the 
same sense that exchange is an economic activity, and producing to give is an economic 
activity in much the same sense as producing for sale. And when we look at the vast 
range of provisioning activity that occurs in contemporary society, we quickly find that 
an enormous proportion of it occurs outside the commodity economy. That provisioning 
activity includes, for example, a broad range of gift economy practices such as charitable 
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giving, volunteering, blood and organ donation, ritual gifts on birthdays and other 
occasions, assistance to friends, neighbours, co-workers and indeed unknown passers-by, 
bequests, and perhaps most substantially of all, sharing of resources and caring labour 
within the household. 
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Although the literature on the gift economy (which can be found predominantly in 
anthropology) is plagued with attempts “to construct a single image or type or form of 
‘the gift’ that can be counterposed to neoclassical exchange” (Danby 2002, 27), not all of 
these gift economy practices work in the same way. Some may seem to fit quite 
comfortably into the conventional commodity/commercial dualism, such as sharing and 
caring within the family. But others do not, and this paper illustrates the point with some 
examples from the wide range of digital giving practices that have become increasingly 
important and prevalent in recent years. 
 
Digital gifts have become ubiquitous on the internet. Indeed the web is based on digital 
gifts: almost every web page we load into our browsers is a complex text offered for 
downloading without any requirement for, or expectation of, any return to be made in 
exchange for viewing the content concerned (Barbrook 2005 [1998]; Berry 2008: 12).
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Web pages, blog posts, videos on YouTube, photographs, advice offered in a vast range 
of forums, and status updates on Facebook, for example, are products of labour that are 
given freely by their creators, and although sites like Facebook may allow creators to 
restrict who may access their creations, much of this material is freely available to 
anyone. These digital gifts entail no obligation to reciprocate, and furthermore, unlike 
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charitable gifts, they entail no sense that the recipient is unable to reciprocate or in any 
way inferior to the donors: there is no stigma entailed in loading a web page without 
reciprocating the gift that it constitutes. These are free gifts, often to strangers, given to 
their recipients as equals. 
 
At this level, there is no obvious connection between digital gifts and either commerce or 
community. Say, for example, a steam train enthusiast spends a number of hours creating 
a web page containing useful information and rare photographs that relate to a certain 
kind of steam engine. Once the page is published, it is freely available to anyone who 
wishes to view it. No commodity changes hands and commerce is utterly absent when 
another web user views the page. Yet there is little trace of community at work here, 
either. Granted, both the author and the reader presumably have some shared interest in 
steam engines, but typically the authors and readers of web pages have no previous 
personal connection, have never met and may never meet each other, and may have very 
different backgrounds and interests beyond the minimal affinities implicit in the act of 
viewing the page. The presumed association of giving with community implicit in our 
straw binary is nowhere to be seen. 
 
Digital communities 
This is not to say, however, that there is no connection between digital gifts and 
communities (nor is it to say that there is no connection between digital gifts and digital 
commerce, as we shall see in later sections). The web is also a site of community 
8 
 
interaction, and inevitably, given the central role of gifts in the web, these interactions are 
fuelled by digital gifts.  
 
Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, for example, rest on a constant flow 
of material that is freely shared by their users: status updates, tweets, links to interesting 
web pages, photographs, and even videos. On Facebook, in particular, a high proportion 
of such sharing occurs between people who already know each other offline (Ellison, 
Steinfield and Lampe 2007: 1155), and thus serves to consolidate and sustain existing 
relationships that have roots in face-to-face interaction. It is a little counter-intuitive to 
think of status updates and tweets as gifts: the closest offline parallel is arguably 
conversation rather than gift-giving.
3
 Yet we may also compare them to newspaper 
stories, which have traditionally been supplied as (parts of) commodities and by contrast 
with these status updates and tweets are a de-commodified form of media: a gift form.  
 
There are, however, multiple kinds of community on the internet. On Facebook, offline 
communities of interaction are reproduced (and sometimes expanded) online. Elsewhere, 
communities are constructed that have less, or even no, prior basis in offline interaction. 
Again, giving, as the characteristic form of interaction on the web, plays a central role, 
but there are important differences between the ways in which giving operates to build 
community ties online and offline.  
 
To understand these phenomena we must engage briefly with the long tradition of 
economic anthropology of the gift centred on the notion of reciprocity and in particular 
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on the work of Marcel Mauss (Mauss 2002 [1950]).
4
 In counterposing the pre-modern 
gift economy to the modern commodity economy, Mauss arguably mirrored the 
community/commodity dualism that is so enamoured of mainstream economics, but there 
are nevertheless valuable elements in his work. Among these is the argument that gifts 
create social ties, and help to build and sustain communities, because they tend to create a 
sense of obligation in the recipient towards the giver of the gift (Godbout and Caillé 
1998: e.g. 10, 12). My view is that different kinds of gifts, in different social contexts, 
have different effects, but that many contemporary gifts do not create a firm obligation to 
reciprocate the gift with one of equivalent value, as Mauss tends to argue they do (Elder-
Vass 2014a). Nevertheless, gifts may help to sustain communities. Thus, for example, 
personal presents in contemporary Western societies are often given as tokens of a desire 
to sustain and perhaps deepen the relationship between giver and recipient. In accepting 
such a gift, the recipient signals acceptance of that continuing relationship, and their 
intention to reciprocate the relationship. Reciprocation of the gift with something vaguely 
equivalent at some point in the future may indeed occur, but this is entirely secondary to 
the larger commitment. 
 
The digital case is different, I suggest, for reasons that derive in part from the technical 
characteristics of digital gifts. Once a digital product has been created and placed in an 
accessible location on the internet, and unlike non-digital physical goods and services, the 
marginal cost of giving away further copies of it is effectively zero. This is one of the 
reasons that the originators of digital goods are often willing to share them so freely, but 
one consequence is that the donor’s gift is no longer a sign of a personal commitment to 
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the recipient, whose degree of disconnection from the giver is so complete that most 
remain utterly anonymous. Equally, and unlike the recipients of gifts of physical goods 
and services, those who receive digital gifts may reasonably feel that their receipt of a 
copy imposed no burden or sacrifice on the originator and thus feel little sense of 
obligation towards the originator, little sense that reciprocation in some form might be 
required or expected. The acceptance of a digital gift need not, therefore, lead to any 
further commitment to a relationship between giver and receive, and may do nothing to 
develop or sustain a community. 
 
Nevertheless, such gifts may sometimes act as a step in the development of an online 
community. The recipient may feel moved to reciprocate directly, perhaps in the form of 
some sign of appreciation—a ‘like’ on a Facebook page, or an appreciative comment in 
an online forum, for example. Or the recipient may feel moved to make a more 
substantial contribution of their own. Conversations may begin, connections may be 
made, recognition of contributions may be made public, and contributors may feel valued 
for their work. This is the stuff of real communities, though their members may never 
meet or even know each other’s names, let alone whether they share any affinities beyond 
the single topic that brought them together. But, unlike the case of offline present giving, 
there may be hundreds or thousands of free riders, taking these gifts without 
reciprocation, for every recipient who by responding becomes part of an online 
community. These are communities to which only the givers belong, and not those 
recipients who take without giving or giving back. 
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A particularly attractive case of such a community is provided by Wikipedia.
5
 Wikipedia 
is created entirely by unpaid volunteers, and indeed anyone can edit a Wikipedia page 
(with a few exceptions). It is run with minimum levels of hierarchy, with disputes being 
resolved largely by the achievement of consensus under the guidance of a well-developed 
set of normative standards, and only rarely by the intervention of administrators, who are 
themselves volunteers selected on the basis of their previous contributions to the project 
(Forte, Larco and Bruckman 2009). Its product is freely available to anyone who chooses 
to make use of it. Its running costs are relatively low given the enormous levels of 
usage—at the time of writing it is the seventh most visited site on the Web (Alexa.com 
2013)—and are met entirely by soliciting voluntary donations from users; indeed the site 
does not even accept advertising.  
 
The users of Wikipedia hardly form a community: their relationship with the pages it 
provides is essentially instrumental. But the contributors to Wikipedia are a different 
matter. They contribute partly for reasons of personal satisfaction, as Clay Shirky has 
stressed in a fascinating account of his reasons (as far as he can tell by introspection) for 
making his first Wikipedia edit. His first reason—“a chance to exercise some unused 
mental capacities” (Shirky 2009: 132)—is reminiscent of unalienated labour: work that is 
done for the sheer pleasure of exercising our creative powers. His second, he describes at 
first as “vanity” but then as the desire to “make a meaningful contribution” to changing 
the world (Shirky 2009: 132)—another aspect of unalienated labour: work in which we 
can exercise our creativity by determining for ourselves what the product of our work 
will be and how it will impact on the world. And his third, which he considers “both the 
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most surprising and the most obvious” was “the desire to do a good thing” (Shirky 2009: 
133): to do something for the benefit of humanity at large. O’Sullivan suggests that 
although these motivations may indeed be significant, for many contributors to Wikipedia 
there are also others that Shirky misses, notably “the attractions of belonging to a 
community, and of being recognized and valued by that community, especially one which 
offers a non-hierarchical and collaborative form of organization. Membership gives 
participants a sense of belonging, a common purpose, and offers mutual support in 
achieving the aims of the group” (O'Sullivan 2009: 87).  
 
This sense of participation in a community comes not only from the feeling of having 
made a contribution to a common endeavour, but also from participation in processes of 
interaction with other contributors (Lessig 2008: 159-160). These processes are highly 
public, though unseen by most Wikipedia users, and anyone can obtain a flavour of them 
by simply clicking on the ‘Talk’ tab of any Wikipedia page. Wikipedia editors contribute 
under pseudonyms, with real names actively discouraged, which severely limits 
connections between users that extend beyond the scope of Wikipedia itself (O'Sullivan 
2009: 88). Yet editors can interact with other editors through the Talk tabs and build up 
significant prestige within the Wikipedia community under their pseudonyms (indicated 
for example by being awarded barnstars by other users) as a consequence of making 
valuable contributions (Reagle 2010: 10), and can also take on more responsible roles as 
a result (Forte, Larco and Bruckman 2009). This is a community that is driven by giving, 
though a very different kind of community than the traditional stereotype. 
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Entanglement 
The phenomenon of open source software is a less pure case of the gift economy in action 
but an equally interesting one.
6
 This is software that is supplied (generally for free) along 
with its humanly-readable program code so that anyone with the appropriate skills can 
modify or extend it, and under license conditions that permit users to do exactly that 
(Stallman 2010: 3). This provides the basis for cooperative development of the software, 
as any programmer can make improvements. Programmers who are interested in 
contributing to a product are free to choose what work to do on it, and then offer their 
improvements back to the open source community. An element of hierarchy does exist in 
these communities, as groups exist which consolidate the most successful modifications 
into new releases of the product, but despite this there is an unusually low level of 
hierarchy and centralised control given the complexity of the product. Nevertheless, open 
source communities have developed some of the most successful software in the world: 
an organisational feat that would previously have been considered impossible (Benkler 
2013: 214). Benkler reports, for example, that such software accounts for “roughly three-
quarters of web servers” and “more than 70 percent of web browsers” (Benkler 2013: 
220). It also includes Linux, an operating system that is used by most of the major 
website providers, and Android, a variant of Linux that is now the most widely-used 
smartphone operating system in the world (Linux Foundation 2012). 
 
Each open source software product develops through the work of an interacting 
community of programmers, who become part of that community by virtue of the gifts of 
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labour they make to the community’s joint project. Like Wikipedia editors they engage in 
debate on how the product of their work should be used, and like Wikipedia editors they 
may develop prestige and recognition within the community on the basis of their 
contributions. But unlike Wikipedia, these are not commerce-free communities. Many of 
those who contribute to these projects are not independent individuals: in the case of the 
Linux kernel, for example (which may not be representative), only 17.9% of the changes 
made between 2005 and 2012 were made by unaffiliated individuals (Corbet, Kroah-
Hartman and McPherson 2012, 9). The vast majority were made by programmers 
working for commercial software companies, notably Red Hat, Novell, Intel, and IBM 
(these four contributed over 30% of the changes). While the data collection method 
means that some of these programmers may have been working on the project in their 
own time, it is clear that most of it is paid work, done for commercial companies, who are 
the real donors of this work to the project.   
 
Commercial companies, like individuals, are responsive to the normative environment 
they face, and one recent study found that one claimed motivation for these contributions 
was a sense of moral obligation to contribute to communities whose work benefitted the 
donating companies (Anderson-Gott, Ghinea and Bygstad 2011, 113). However, both this 
and other studies have found, as we might expect, that the predominant motivations are 
more profit oriented. Broadly speaking, these fall into two classes: (a) selling 
complementary products and services (Weber 2004, 195-203); and (b) benefitting from 
the rapid innovation cycle in successful open source communities without needing to do 
all the software development themselves. IT services companies who are actively 
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involved in developing an open source product develop deep expertise that enables them 
to provide support and integration services to companies that wish to use that product, 
and can offer, for example, to write fixes and new function for a customer which will 
then become part of the open source product (Anderson-Gott, Ghinea and Bygstad 2011, 
109). Red Hat, for example, market themselves as “The world’s leading provider of open 
source enterprise IT products and services” (Red Hat 2012). The second type of benefit 
was nicely explained by Kevin McEntee, VP of Systems & ECommerce Engineering at 
Netflix: “We benefit from the continuous improvements provided by the community of 
contributors outside of Netflix. We also benefit by contributing back the changes we 
make to the projects. By sharing our bug fixes and new features back out into the 
community, the community then in turn continues to improve upon bug fixes and new 
features that originated at Netflix and then we complete the cycle by bring those 
improvements back into Netflix” (McEntee 2010). 
 
Conventional economists will not be surprised by these profit-oriented motives, but they 
are being pursued here in a way that has very little connection with the economics of 
markets. These companies are investing in work that is then released into the open source 
community for free, in the hope that these contributions will reap returns that are 
themselves entirely voluntary and somewhat unpredictable. Indeed the most successful of 
these companies recognise that their success depends on them actively supporting the 
open source community and its ethos of sharing the software it produces freely, as Red 
Hat has recognised from the outset (Lessig 2008: 179-184). Once again, we find 
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commerce and community, not on opposite sides of a binary divide, but interacting, in 
this case to their mutual benefit. 
 
Individual contributors to open source projects have equally diverse motivations, many of 
them equally inaccessible to market-oriented understandings of human action. There is no 
wage for their contributions, nor do they exchange them for some contractually agreed 
return of value. Why, then, do they make these free gifts to strangers? Some of the 
motives include elements of self-interest, the focus of Lerner and Tirole’s somewhat 
economistic analysis (Lerner and Tirole 2002). For example, programmers who make 
frequent or high quality contributions to open source projects achieve recognition from 
their fellow contributors and thus prestige within the project community—generally a 
virtual community, in the sense that face-to-face meetings are rare and largely peripheral 
to the community process, but nevertheless a source of interaction and validation for its 
members (213; what Lerner and Tirole call the “ego gratification incentive”). These 
reputational benefits—symbolic capital, in Bourdieu’s terms—may be valued in their 
own right but they are sometimes also converted into more material benefits, as for 
example when a programmer gains a good reputation within an open source community 
and is then able to secure a well-paid job, or independent consultancy contracts, or easier 
access to venture capital for a start-up, as a result (the “career concern incentive”: 2002: 
213, 217-220). It seems unlikely, however, that the distant prospect of such an outcome 
provides the initial motivation for many contributors—we must distinguish between 
career benefits that sometimes accrue and the question of whether the prospect of such 
benefits is a significant motivator.  
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Other motivations are more difficult for conventional economics to accommodate. As 
Benkler puts it, one is simply “the pleasure of creation” (Benkler 2002)—a factor that 
essentially contradicts economic understandings of labour as a cost that must be 
compensated for by some other reward. At least some of these programmers are people 
who enjoy programming, enjoy putting their brains to work at solving problems and 
creating something of value to a wider community. Theirs is the pleasure of unalienated 
labour, labour in which the worker chooses her task, controls her own labour process and 
product, can interact with others involved in the process as a free and equal individual, 
and can exercise her creativity for the wider benefit of humanity (by contrast with 
alienated labour as described in (Marx 1978 [1844], 74-6). This is labour freed from the 
tyranny of the market, a kind of labour that is sometimes denigrated as a mere hobby, and 
yet a kind of labour that is intensely productive of the flourishing that our economies so 
often fail to generate. 
 
Inducement gifts 
Cases such as the free development of open source software by companies that sell 
complementary goods and services are a variety of a more general form of gifts that we 
may call inducement gifts. In inducement giving practices the donor gives in order to 
induce a commercial transaction, or a series of such transactions, that are collectively of 
greater value to the giver than the original gift. This is another type of giving that is 
growing rapidly as a result of the possibilities opened up by digital technology (Anderson 
2009). Unlike many other giving practices, which often represent economic forms that we 
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may see as alternatives to, or in competition with, contemporary capitalism, inducement 
giving is giving turned to the service of capitalism. Within this cluster of practices we 
constantly find “an entanglement of gifts within the commodity form” (Fuchs 2008: 171). 
Inducement giving is a set of non-exchange practices deep within the commercial 
economy (but also a set of practices with relatively little relation to anything resembling 
traditional conceptions of community). One implication is that even if our aim is only to 
understand the commercial economy we must also take account of other kinds of 
motivation and other kinds of practice than those analysed in commodity exchange 
models of commerce. At the same time, we can see here a tussle for control of important 
economic spaces, in which there is a kind of colonisation of giving going on, in which the 
commercial economy acts back on the form and usage of giving practices. 
 
Inducement gifts are not themselves part of an exchange, nor is there a strong normative 
requirement for a reciprocal return of equivalent (or even different) value. Any return by 
the recipient is entirely voluntary, but the gift is nevertheless designed to produce such a 
return. So this is a variety of giving that may sometimes generate an element of 
reciprocation but a very different kind of reciprocation than that involved in pure 
exchange, first because it is voluntary, and second because it is often far from equivalent 
in value. There are at least three significant varieties of inducement giving. 
 
In the first variety the inducement gift is intended to induce subsequent exchanges in the 
market. We may call these marketing gifts. Anderson, for example, describes the strategy 
adopted in the U.S. in the early twentieth century to market Jell-O, a gelatine-based food 
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product. Unable by law to sell their product door to door, the company’s sales force gave 
away recipe books with recipes for using the product instead. The result was to encourage 
consumers to buy the product in order to try out the recipes (Anderson 2009: 9-10). This 
has long been a fairly widespread phenomenon in commercial economies, but it is one 
that has been given a new lease of life by digital developments. One contemporary digital 
case is the phenomenon of “advergaming” in which companies give away computer 
games that feature their products in ways designed to encourage the gamer to buy them 
(or ask their parents/carers to do so) (Lumpkin and Dess 2004: 166). This is also the logic 
behind the currently rapidly growing phenomenon of free computer games in which 
gamers can make accelerated progress or enhance their participation in other ways by 
making in-game purchases—a $2 billion market in the U.S. in 2011 (Cheshire 2012: 
139).
7
 Such gifts do not entail an obligation to reciprocate, but they are designed to 
induce a response that generates a return to the original giver. That response, however, is 
not a return gift but a market exchange in its own right, from which the original giver 
expects to make a profit.   
 
The second variety of inducement gifts is what I will call solicitation gifts. These gifts are 
linked to a request for a return gift that is nevertheless entirely voluntary. The origin of 
the name is the case of the beggar’s flower: a gift given by a beggar that is then followed 
by a request for a return gift of money. In principle the return gift is optional, but, if one 
accepts the flower, reciprocation may be strongly expected by the giver and the recipient 
may experience strong criticism from the giver if a return gift is not made. Such cases 
approach quite closely to the principle of reciprocity, despite being nominally free, and 
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one clear reason for this is that the beggar’s flowers are a limited resource. Whether the 
beggar has bought the flower, grown it, or picked it from the roadside, there is some cost 
to the beggar in replenishing their supply so they need to ensure that they achieve a 
reasonably high rate of reciprocation. When potential recipients are aware of these 
expectations, accepting the flower is more or less a signal of intent to reciprocate.  
 
Solicitation gifts depend in part for their effectiveness on the cultural associations they 
invoke: the sense discussed earlier in which gifts are signs of mutual commitment, and 
the expectation of fair reciprocity that is built into some types of giving. Such 
associations can be exploited in a variety of commercial contexts to provoke returns to 
the original giver that carry the outward form of market exchange (unlike the return gift 
to the beggar) and yet are motivated in part, not by the purchaser’s need for the thing 
purchased, but by a sense of normative obligation to the seller. 
 
In the digital economy the virtually costless nature of digital gifts changes the dynamic of 
solicitation gifts radically. When the digital gift is effectively free (at least at the margin) 
to the giver as well as the recipient, the giver can afford to give away vast numbers of 
gifts even if the rate of reciprocation is extremely low. In such circumstances it is not 
necessary to pressure the recipient for a return and there can be a much stronger sense in 
which the return is voluntary for the original recipient. This is a practice that has 
mushroomed recently in the smartphone app market
8
 (though it has roots in the PC 
shareware movement). Many software apps are available from the app markets in two 
forms: a free form and a paid form. Nominally the paid form may be superior in some 
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way—the ‘freemium’ business model (Anderson 2009: 26-7) but in practice the free 
version is often very close in functionality to the paid version—it may, for example, do 
everything that the paid version does but include a start-up screen encouraging the user to 
upgrade to the paid version, or it may be identical to the paid version except that 
advertisements are displayed on certain screens. Another feature of these apps is that 
even the paid versions are remarkably cheap—perhaps a twentieth or a fiftieth of the 
price of a console game.  
 
In cases where the paid version is markedly superior to the free version, we may regard 
the free version as a marketing gift, designed to induce the recipient to purchase the paid 
version. But in cases where the paid version is very similar to the free version, why do 
users upgrade? No doubt there are many reasons, but one is simply the feeling that the 
suppliers of the app deserve a reward for providing something that we experience as 
having significant use value. Such feelings are encouraged, though fairly subtly on the 
whole, by introductory messages from the developers and by occasional comments by 
other users. For a purer case of this phenomenon, consider the launch of the album In 
Rainbows by Radiohead: “Rather than release its seventh album into stores as usual, the 
band released it online with the request that you pay as much or as little as you wanted. 
Some chose to pay nothing… while others paid more than $20. Overall, the average price 
was $6 (Anderson 2009: 153). 
 
The return gift in these cases is itself a further free gift, but it is one that is motivated by a 
sense of the justice of paying something for what we have received. These are not 
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reciprocal gifts in the sense that reciprocation is required by either gift in the sequence, 
yet they do share something of the spirit of reciprocity.  
 
Let me call the third variety of inducement gifts loaded gifts. These are gifts whose 
acceptance or use automatically entails a return gift that is in a sense hidden, or at least an 
implicit rather than an explicit element of the process. A prime contemporary example of 
this is Google search. When a user searches the web using Google, the search results that 
are returned are a gift from Google, a service that has value to the recipient but for which 
there is no charge. Yet at the same time, the user returns two implicit gifts to Google: the 
gift of their attention, and the gift of information about their interests, in the form of the 
search terms that they have entered. Google in turn frequently makes use of these gifts to 
present advertising to the user, using the information supplied by the user to identify 
which adverts would be most relevant to the user’s current interests. At this point, Google 
has not yet realised any value from the user’s gift, but if the user then clicks on one of the 
ads Google collects a commission from the advertiser.
9
 This is what Anderson calls a 
“three party market” (Anderson 2009: 24-5) and in some respects the basic structure is 
similar to advertising in conventional media: the media publisher sells the attention of its 
readers to advertisers, thus generating a commercial transaction from that attention. One 
of the things that makes Google different from most conventional publishers (though not 
all)
10
 is that the reader is acquired by giving a gift: in this case, free search results.  
 
One might doubt whether Google’s search results are really a gift at all, or perhaps a form 
of exchange. And are these search results, if they are a gift, a form of free giving—a gift 
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that entails no obligation to reciprocate—or a form of reciprocal giving, since there is an 
element of reciprocation built into the nature of the process?  It is tempting to think of 
Google search as a mix of gift and exchange—a particularly clear example of the 
“entanglement” of the gift and commodity forms stressed by Fuchs (Fuchs 2008: 171, 
185), or of what Lawrence Lessig calls “hybrid economies” (Lessig 2008: chapter 7).  
 
Such hybrids are becoming increasingly important, but they do not rest on a single model 
of interaction between commerce and community; many such forms are possible, and 
they will continue to coexist with purer forms of the commerce and community models. 
These many forms of digital gifts and digital hybrid economies reinforce an argument 
that has been made particularly effectively by the feminist geographers J.K. Gibson-
Graham: that the economy we occupy is not straightforwardly or overwhelmingly a 
capitalist (or commercial) one, but already a radically diverse economy (Gibson-Graham 
2006). The new forms that are emerging in the digital economy simply increase that 
existing diversity. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has deployed examples of digital giving practices to support a series of 
interlinked arguments about the relations between commerce, community, and giving 
itself.  Perhaps the most striking conclusion is that different giving practices stand in 
radically different relations to these phenomena. Consider community: contributions to 
Facebook help to sustain and extend existing offline communities; contributions to 
Wikipedia develop a virtual community that includes the givers but not the receivers; and 
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Google’s gifts of search results do not develop a community at all. Digital giving cannot 
be simplistically identified with community as if there were some simple, consistent, and 
universal relation between the two. Consider commerce: Wikipedia is a commerce-free 
environment; Facebook provides a space for individuals to share freely with each other, 
yet is provided for profit and disfigured by commercial advertising; while inducement 
gifts are given purely in order to generate linked commercial transactions. Digital giving 
cannot be simplistically separated from commerce, as if the two were utterly antagonistic, 
and yet some forms of giving offer real alternatives to commodity exchange as a form of 
organising our provisioning and thus our economy. And in some of these spaces, giving 
is implicated in both community and commerce, which coexist, overlap, and interact.  
 
One reason for focusing on digital giving is to unsettle the common assumption that 
giving is in some way a pre-modern activity. Robert Garnett has argued that we must 
“undo the modernist separation of economic science from economic anthropology—to 
recognize that a market-based economy is characterized by the very ‘premodern’ 
qualities commonly ascribed to gift economies such as thick sociality, complex networks 
of interlocking obligations, and temporal separations of outlay and return” (Garnett 2010: 
127). Garnett rightly problematizes the assumption that such qualities are premodern with 
his scare quotes but I would also wish to move beyond the related assumption that it is 
only anthropology, with its focus on predominantly nonmodern economies, to which 
economics needs to connect. Contemporary giving is not the same as nonmodern giving; 
contemporary community is not the same as nonmodern community; and it is the 
contemporary forms of these that economics needs to come to terms with. The 
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commerce/community binary is above all a device for excusing economists from 
engagement with the thick sociality of actual economic practice, as Garnett suggests, and 
to my mind this demands a thorough engagement with the sociology of economic life as 
well as with the lessons of anthropology. There is more than one modernist disciplinary 
wall that must come crashing down if we are to recognise the fully social, complexly 
determined, and culturally specific nature of commodity exchange as well as of the gift 
economy. 
 
Rejecting the dualism of commerce and community is just one step towards a wider 
recognition that both are intensely social, that both are diverse, and that the mainstream 
tradition of understanding the economy as a set of highly stylised “markets” in which 
faceless optimising rational actors interact briefly at the moment of exchange is utterly 
inadequate for the explanation of any part of the economy. 
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Notes 
1
 For related arguments, see for example (Gibson-Graham 2006) and (Negru 2010). 
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2
 The primary exception is web sites that only allow access on a paid basis, whether pay-
per-view or through a subscription. Content provided on this basis is not a gift but a 
commodity. 
3
 I thank Dave Beer for making this point in a seminar at the University of York on 5 
June 2013. 
4
 I have criticised the tendency of Mauss and his followers to see the gift economy as so 
firmly oriented to reciprocity that it becomes little more than an alternative form of 
exchange (Elder-Vass 2014a). Nevertheless, reciprocity does play a significant role in 
some giving practices. 
5
 This paragraph is based largely on material from O’Sullivan (2009), and Reagle (2010). 
6
 For more on open source software as a form of gift economy, see Elder-Vass (2014b), 
upon which much of this section is based.   
7
 At the time of writing, many of these games are delivered through Facebook. 
8
 App is another word for a computer program or piece of software, usually used to refer 
to a program that can be used on a smartphone. I follow usual practice here in calling the 
sites from which apps can be acquired markets, although the term is thoroughly 
inappropriate when the apps are free. 
9
 This business model is explained thoroughly by Battelle (2005: chapters 5-7) and Levy 
(2011: part 2). 
10 
Free newspapers have become increasingly common in recent years. 
